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I. INTRODUCTION
The Colorado River is one of the most thoroughly studied,
debated, and contested natural resources in the world, and for good
reason. For residents of the seven basin states and northwestern
Mexico, it is both an economic lifeline and a cultural marker,
massively engineered to provide a steady flow of water and
hydropower for cities, farms and industry, while retaining enough
wildness to showcase a stunning diversity of physical, environmental,
and recreational amenities. By almost any standard, it is the jewel of
the American Southwest-and it is in trouble. The primary focus of
the struggles and investments, from a political, legal, economic and
engineering nature, has been to utilize the river as a water supply
source, even when this has meant sacrificing other values and uses.
But the ability of the river to fulfill this central function is
increasingly doubtful and, for a variety of reasons, is likely to
become further compromised should we continue along the current
management pathway.
There are several related fundamental problems in the
Colorado: (1) the complex body of laws and agreements known as
the Law of the River promises more water than has ever existed; (2)
the shortfall between allocated water and real water is projected to
grow in the coming decades; and (3) the distribution of the inevitable
shortage is fraught with interstate inequities, legal ambiguities, and
1. This article is largely an amalgam of two white papers, namely: The
Colo. River Governance Initiative of the U. of Colo., Rethinking the Future of the
Colorado River (Dec. 2010) (available at http://www.rlch.org/archive/wp-
content/uploads/2010/12/CRGI-Interim-Report.pdf); and Ctr. for Nat. Resources &
Envtl. Policy at the U. of Mont. & Carpe Diem West, Thinking Like a River Basin:
Leaders' Perspectives on Options and Opportunities in Colorado River
Management (Apr. 2011) (available at http://www.carpediemwest.org/colorado-
report).
2. Kenney is Director of the Western Water Policy Program ("WWPP"),
University of Colorado Natural Resources Law Center. Bates is a Senior Fellow of
the Center for Natural Resources & Environmental Policy and Adjunct Professor of
Law, University of Montana. Bensard and Berggren are WWPP Research
Associates.
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management uncertainties. Perhaps more fundamentally, these
problems have, to this point, overwhelmed the governance
arrangements in the basin. Historically, political leaders have lacked
incentives to acknowledge-let alone tackle-such sensitive issues.
Meanwhile, recourse to interstate litigation is near-universally
panned as a costly, uncertain, and likely inadequate solution.3 The
hard reality of rapidly declining reservoirs, however, has pushed
basin leaders to increasingly look for processes and ideas to resolve
these longstanding problems.
II. WATER ALLOCATION AND UTILIZATION
A. An Overview of the Law of the River
The Colorado River and its tributaries originate from
snowmelt high in the Rocky Mountains. The river flows southwest
through the states of Colorado, Wyoming, Utah, New Mexico,
Nevada, Arizona, and California, and then, for a short distance,
across the international border into Mexico.4  Along its path, the
Colorado is controlled by approximately two-dozen significant
storage and diversion projects, including Lake Powell (formed by
Glen Canyon Dam) and Lake Mead (formed by Hoover Dam). These
reservoirs have transformed the region and the river in countless
ways, including altering the Colorado from an unpredictable and
sediment-heavy warm-water river to an elaborate plumbing system
that helps to supply 30 million people with cold, clear water.5
3. Ctr. for Nat. Resources & Envtl. Policy at the U. of Mont. & Carpe
Diem West, Thinking Like a River Basin: Leaders' Perspectives on Options and
Opportunities in Colorado River Management (Apr. 2011) (available at
http://www.carpediemwest.org/colorado-report) [hereinafter "CNREP"].
4. See e.g. Peter Gleick, The World's Water: A Biennial Report on
Freshwater Resources (Island Press 2002); Dale Pontius, Colorado River Basin
Study: Final Report (1997).
5. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Colorado River Basin Supply and
Demand Study: Basin Study Program 1 (2009) (available at
http://www.usbr.gov/WaterSMART/docs/Colorado%20River.pdf); See e.g. Robert
Adler, Restoring the Environment and Restoring Democracy: Lessons from the
Colorado River, 25 Va. Envtl. L.J. 55 (2007); Steven Carothers & Bryan Brown,
The Colorado River through the Grand Canyon: Natural History and Human
Change (U. Ariz. Press 1991).
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The Law of the River governs allocation, use, and
6
management of the Colorado River. By some accounts, the law
features at least 50 key elements,7 including interstate compacts,
treaties (with Mexico and Indian tribes), Congressional legislation,
and numerous court decisions. The seminal document within the
Law of the River is the Colorado River Compact (the "Compact"),
signed in 1922.8 The seven basin states are legally bound by the
Compact's quantitative apportionments, which are allocated in
perpetuity. 9 Despite the intentions of its drafters, the Compact has
spurred highly contentious litigation and numerous supplemental
agreements. Additionally, as discussed later, numerous ambiguities
and omissions remain in the Law of the River.
The primary purposes of the Compact were the division of the
river's flow between the states of the Upper Basin (Colorado,
6. The Law of the River is the subject of a vast body of literature. Legal
overviews are provided by many authors. See generally David Getches et al., The
Law of the Colorado River: Coping with Severe Sustained Drought, 31 J. Am.
Water Res. Assn. 825 (1995); James Lochhead, An Upper Basin Perspective on
California's Claim to Water from the Colorado River - Part I: The Law of the
River, 4 U. Denver Water L. Rev. 290 (2001); James Lochhead, An Upper Basin
Perspective on California's Claims to the Colorado River Part II: The
Development, Implementation and Collapse of California's Plan to Live within its
Basic Apportionment, 6 U. Denver Water L. Rev. 318 (2003). Excellent historical
reviews of key events and institutional innovations are provided by many authors.
See generally Norris Hundley, Jr., Dividing the Waters: A Century of Controversy
between the United States and Mexico (U. Cal. Press 1966); Norris Hundley, Jr.,
Water and the West: The Colorado River Compact and the Politics of Water in the
American West (2d ed., U. Cal Press 2009); Norris Hundley, Jr., The Great Thirst:
Californians and Water (2d rev. ed., U. Cal. Press 2001); Marc Resiner, Cadillac
Desert: The American West and Its Disappearing Water (Penguin Group 1986);
Philip L. Fradkin, A River No More: the Colorado River and the West (U. Cal.
Press 1981).
7. James Lawrence Powell, Dead Pool: Lake Powell, Global Warming,
and the Future of Water in the West 230 (U. Cal. Press 2008).
8. Colorado River Compact, Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 37-61-101 to 37-
61-104 (West 2010) [hereinafter "Compact"].
9. For a history of the Compact negotiations, see generally Hundley,
Water and the West: The Colorado River Compact and the Politics of Water in the
American West, supra n. 6; Daniel Tyler, Silver Fox of the Rockies: Delphus E.
Carpenter and Western Water Compacts (U. Okla. Press 2003).
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Wyoming, Utah, and New Mexico) and Lower Basin (Arizona,
California, and Nevada),10 the elimination of current and future
interstate disputes, and the promotion of orderly river development
and management." Some of the key provisions include:
* Article 111(a) allocates 7.5 million acre-feet ("MAF") per year
of consumptive use to each Basin, while Article 111(b) allows
the Lower Basin to increase its consumptive use by an
additional 1 MAF/year. 12
* Article 111(c) provides for administration of any later
apportionment to Mexico (Similarly, Article VII anticipates,
but does not otherwise address, future apportionments to
Indian tribes.). 13
* Article 111(d) calls for a minimum flow volume at Lee Ferry
(the dividing point between the two basins) of 75 MAF for
any period of ten consecutive years. 14
* Article VIII describes water rights already being exercised at
the time of the agreement (so-called Present Perfected Rights)
as being "unimpaired" by the Compact apportionment.' 5
Congress ratified the Compact as part of the Boulder Canyon
Project Act of 1928.16 In addition to the Compact, the Act authorized
the construction of the Boulder (now Hoover) Dam and All-
American Canal and provided the three-state division of the Lower
Basin apportionment. 17  As later confirmed by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Arizona v. California, the apportionment annually provides
4.4 MAF of water to California, 2.8 MAF to Arizona, and 0.3 MAF
10. The Compact uses the terms "Division" and "Basin" to distinguish
between the two groups of states. "Basin" encompasses drainage areas, while
"division" is limited to political jurisdictions. However, for the purpose of this
article, the terms will be used synonymously. Compact, supra n. 8, at art. II.
11. Compact, supra n. 8, at art. 1.
12. Id. at art. III.
13. Id. at art. III, VII.
14. Id. at art. 111(d).
15. Id. at art. VIII.
16. Boulder Canyon Project Act, 43 U.S.C. § 617 (2006).
17. Compact, supra n. 8, art. 1, art. IV(a).
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to Nevada.' The 1944 Treaty with Mexico provides the downstream
nation with a minimum apportionment of 1.5 MAF annually.' 9 The
broad contours of the interstate apportionment were finalized in 1948
in the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, which allocates the
Upper Basin apportionment by percentages: 51.75% for Colorado,
23% for Utah, 11.25% for New Mexico, and 14% for Wyoming. 20
As tribal rights are quantified in court cases (see e.g. Arizona v.
California2 1) and negotiated settlements, 22 tribes subtract their
allocation from the state in which their reservation is located.
The Law of the River also includes several acts of Congress
relating to water project authorization and operation. Examples
include the Colorado River Storage Project Act of 1956,23 which
provided an Upper Basin development plan and authorized the
construction of Glen Canyon Dam (Lake Powell), and the Colorado
River Basin Project Act of 1968,24 which authorized several projects,
including the Central Arizona Project ("CAP"), and provided a
framework for long-range reservoir operations. In 2007, the basin
states agreed to the "Colorado River Interim Guidelines for Lower
Basin Shortages and Coordinated Operations for Lake Powell and
18. Ariz. v. Cal., 373 U.S. 546, 576-578 (1963).
19. Treaty with Mexico Respecting Utilization of the Waters of the
Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande, 59 Stat. 1219, 1237 (Nov. 14,
1944) T.S. No. 994 (effective Nov. 8, 1945).
20. Additionally, 50,000 acre-feet is allocated to users in northeastern
Arizona. Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 37-62-
101.
21. Ariz. v. Cal., 547 U.S. 150, 157-159 (2006). Tribal rights quantified
in Arizona v. California include: the Chemehuevi Indian Reservation (11,340 AF),
the Cocopah Indian Reservation (9,707 AF), the Fort Yuma Indian Reservation
(77,966 AF), and the Colorado River Indian Reservation (719,248 AF). Id.
22. Press Release, Navajo Nation Council, Navajo Nation Council
Approves Northeastern Arizona Indian Water Rights Settlement (Nov. 4, 2010).
The Navajo Nation's Colorado River settlement provides for: (1) 31,000 AF of
water from the mainstem of the Colorado River; (2) any unclaimed flows from the
little Colorado River; and (3) nearly unlimited access to two underground aquifers.
Id.
23. Colorado River Basin Storage Project Act of 1956, 43 U.S.C. §§
620(A)-(O) (2006).
24. Colorado River Basin Project Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1556 (2006).
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Lake Mead" (the "Interim Guidelines"), which update the approach
to reservoir operations during shortage conditions and feature a
schedule of Lower Basin curtailments when insufficient storage
exists in Lake Mead to support 7.5 MAF of Lower Basin
consumption from the mainstem.25 Under the Interim Guidelines,
curtailments are to be enacted in stages based on reservoir
26elevations, and would primarily target water delivered by the CAP,
which is junior to the California apportionment, and other Arizona
uses of mainstem water (as stated in the Colorado River Basin
Project Act).27 The guidelines remain in effect until 2025 for water
supply determinations and 2026 for reservoir operations.28
B. Mismatch of Supplies and Demands
Estimating average annual flows on the Colorado River is a
complex and controversial undertaking. Early gauges were
inaccurate, not all major tributaries are monitored, and estimating
"natural" flows at Lee Ferry (the official measuring point) requires
subtracting or "backing out" upstream depletions. 29 These technical
issues, combined with unusually wet years preceding the Compact,
led negotiators to overestimate flows and, thus, over-allocate the
resource. 30  Article 111(a) of the Compact, combined with the
25. Bureau of Reclamation, Colorado River Interim Guidelines for Lower
Basin Shortages and the Coordinated Operations for Lake Powell and Lake Mead,
Record of Decision (Dec. 13, 2007).
26. Id. at 34.
27. Id. at 25.
28. Id. at 4. A variety of other statutes and agreements, covering issues
such as environmental protection and intrastate water management, are omitted
from this cursory Law of the River review. The focus of this article is primarily the
large-scale allocation of water between the Upper and Lower Basins, and to a lesser
extent, between the States comprising each sub-Basin.
29. Eric Kuhn, The Colorado River: The Story of a Quest for Certainty on
a Diminishing River (Roundtable Ed.) 68 (Colo. River Water Conserv. Bd. 2007).
30. Records used by Compact negotiators suggested an annual Lee Ferry
flow of at least 16.8 MAF, although the Reclamation Service (Bureau of
Reclamation) suggested a more conservative estimate of 16.4 MAF. However,
once the Compact was signed and the process of state-by-state ratification began, it
became evident that several negotiators believed the 16.4 MAF/year was overly
conservative, and many negotiators internally operated on assumptions of larger
flows. For example, in Utah, R.E. Caldwell told the state legislature that the annual
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Mexican Treaty, collectively allocate 16.5 MAF/year of consumptive
use of Colorado River water among users in the seven basin states
and Mexico, a total that increases to 17.5 MAF/year when Article
111(b) is included. The conventional interpretation of the Supreme
Court's decision in Arizona v. California is that this "basic
apportionment" is for water from the mainstem and tributaries above
Lee Ferry. 3 1 Lower Basin tributaries, such as the Gila River, are
exempt.32 The river, however, provides significantly less than the
Compact apportions. The best estimate of long-term river yields
comes by way of paleo reconstructions-i.e., estimates of past flows
based primarily on tree-ring studies. These studies look back as far
as 762 A.D. and suggest an annual average of 14.7 MAF.33 This is
only slightly dryer than measured 2 0 th century flows of 15.2 MAF.3 4
yield exceeded 20 MAF; in Colorado, Delph Carpenter offered an estimate of 20.5
MAF; in Wyoming, Frank Emerson argued that the river yields 22 MAF. Hundley,
Water and the West: The Colorado River Compact and the Politics of Water in the
American West, supra n. 6, at 217 (Utah), 222 (Colo.), and 220 (Wyo.).
31. Some compact scholars have indicated that Art. 111(b) water was
included to account for the lower basin tributaries. However, the Supreme Court in
Arizona v. California held that these lower basin tributaries are not included in the
Compact's apportionment but are instead reserved for Arizona and Nevada's
exclusive use. For further discussion, see Section III(B) - Issue 3 of this paper.
32. Ariz. v. Cal., 373 U.S. at 569; see also John Carlson, The Colorado
River Compact: A Breeding Ground for International, National, and Interstate
Controversies (Nat. Resources Law Ctr., U. Colo. Sch. of Law 1989). This issue is
discussed further in Section III(B) - Issue 3.
33. Woodhouse et al. used reconstruction models that suggested a long-
term mean (1520-1961) of 14.7 or 14.3 MAF, depending on the model. Meko et
al. looked further back (A.D. 762-2005) and confirmed previous analyses that
long-term river yields are lower than observed gauge data. In addition, Meko et al.
also found the most severe drought to be in the mid-i 100s, characterized by a
decrease of more than 15% of mean annual flow averaged over 25 years.
Woodhouse et al., Updated Streamflow Reconstructions for the Upper Colorado
River Basin, 42 Water Resources Research W05415 (2006); David M. Meko et al.,
Medieval Drought in the Upper Colorado River Basin, 34 Geophys. Res. Ltr.
L10705 (2007). See also National Academy of Sciences, Colorado River Basin
Water Management: Evaluating and Adjusting to Hydroclimatic Variability 5
(2007).
34. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Tree-ring Reconstructions of
Streamflow and Climate and their Application to Colorado River Basin Water
Management 44 (2008).
2011] 109
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For planning purposes, approximatelyl5 MAF is a commonly used
35estimate.
Flows in the first decade of the 2 1st century have disappointed
water managers throughout the basin, averaging slightly over 12
MAF/year.36 Of particular concern is the notion that these flows may
not merely be a drought that will eventually ease, but may be the
leading edge of the climate changes that are predicted for this basin. 37
Although many people view climate change as a relatively new
phenomenon and area of study in the Colorado River Basin, scientists
hypothesized as early as 1983 hypothesized that anthropogenic
emissions of greenhouse gasses will increase temperatures and aridity
in the Colorado Basin. 38  Today, this viewpoint dominates the
academic literature. 39 In a review of the 19 global circulation models
35. Douglas Kenney et al., Rethinking the Future of the Colorado River
16 (Nat. Resources Law Ctr. 2010).
36. Upper Colorado River Commission, Sixty-First Annual Report of the
Upper Colorado River Commission 21 (2009).
37. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Appendix U: Climate Technical Work
Group Report, in Final Environmental Impact Statement (2007).
38. Roger E. Revelle & Paul E. Waggoner, Effects of Carbon Dioxide-
Induced Climatic Change on Water Supplies on the Western United States, in
Changing Climate (Carbon Dioxide Assessment Comm. 1983).
39. For a comprehensive review, see U.S. Bureau of Reclamation,
Appendix U: Climate Technical Work Group Report, in Final Environmental
Impact Statement (2007). Other relevant studies include: Tim Barnett et al., The
Effects of Climate Change on Water Resources in the West, 62 Climatic Change 1
(2004); Bryson C. Bates et al., Climate Change and Water (IPCC 2008); Niklas
Christensen & Dennis P. Lettenmaier, A Mutlimodel Ensemble Approach to
Assessment of Climate Change Impacts on the Hydrology and Water Resources of
the Colorado River Basin, 3 Hydro. Earth Syst. Sci. Discuss. 3727 (2007); Niklas
Christensen et al., The Effects of Climate Change on the Hydrology and Water
Resources of the Colorado River Basin, 62 Climatic Change 337 (2004); Martin P.
Hoerling & Jon Eisheid, Past Peak Water in the Southwest, 6 Southwest Hydrology
18 (2007); Gregory McCabe & David Wolock, Warming May Create Substantial
Water Supply Shortages in the Colorado River Basin, 34 Geophys. Res. Ltr.
L22708 (2007); W. Paul Miller & Thomas C. Piechota, Regional Analysis of Trend
and Step Changes Observed in Hydroclimatic Variables around the Colorado
River Basin, 9 J. of Hydrometreology 1020 (2008); P. Christopher D. Milly et al.,
Global Patterns of Trends in Streamflow and Water Availability in a Changing
Climate, 438 Nature 347 (2005); Linda Nash & Peter Gleick, The Colorado River
Basin and Climatic Change: The Sensitivity of Streamflow and Water Supply to
Variations, in Temperature and Precipitation 121 (1991); Richard Seager et al.,
Model Projections of an Imminent Transition to a More Arid Climate in
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("GCMs") used in the Third Assessment Report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change ("IPCC"), Seager et al.
noted that "there is a broad consensus amongst climate models that
this region will dry significantly in the 21st century and that the
transition to a more arid climate should already be underway."4 0 In
41fact, 18 of the 19 GCMs project a dryer climate by 2021-2040.
While the consensus of the scientific literature is that the
average flow of the Colorado will decline over the rest of the century
(and perhaps beyond), considerable uncertainty remains regarding the
magnitude and speed of the decline. Despite these uncertainties, the
majority of climate change research suggests declines between 10-
4230% by the middle of the century. Applying these percentages to
an assumed average of 15 MAF/year translates to an average flow of
13.5 to 10.5 MAF/year. Additionally, these reductions in average
flows are expected to be accompanied by an increase in the
frequency and duration of droughts. 43
The combined impact of reduced flows and increased
droughts is particularly disconcerting and is a major thread of current
research on the Colorado River. 44 Also of concern is the sensitivity
of storage levels in the basin to these changes. Numerous studies
have found that even small reductions in Colorado River flow can
Southwestern North America, 10 Science 1181 (2007); and Charles Stockton &
William Boggess, Geohydrological Implications of Climate Change on Water
Resource Development (1979).
40. Seager, supra n. 39, at 1181.
41. Id.
42. Tim Barnett & David Pierce, Sustainable Water Deliveries from the
Colorado River in a Changing Climate, 160 Proceedings of the Natil. Acad. of Sci.
7334 (2009). Other researchers cite similar numbers. See e.g. Seager, supra n. 39;
United States Geological Survey ("USGS"), Effects of Climate Change and Land
Use on Water Resources in the Upper Colorado River Basin 2 (2011). Projected
flow declines by mid-century are largely shaped by greenhouse gas emissions that
have already occurred, thereby resulting in relatively consistent output among
models and researchers. For longer term projections, the GCM output is highly
dependent on assumptions of future emissions. Widely different emission
assumptions lead to widely different projections in flow.
43. Jonathan Overpeck & Bradley Udall, Dry Times Ahead, 328 Science
1642 (2010). See e.g. Hoerling, supra n. 39; McCabe, supra n. 39.
44. Id. at 1642-1643.
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have significant and immediate impacts on storage levels.4 5  For
example, modeling by Christensen et al. for the time periods 2010-
39, 2040-69, and 2070-98 suggested runoff declines of 14%, 18%,
and 17%, respectively, with corresponding declines in reservoir
46
storage of 36%, 32% and 40%. Certainly the current drought
illustrates the vulnerability of reservoir storage. From 1998 to 2010,
combined storage in Lakes Powell and Mead dropped by more than
22 MAF,47 leading to the "bathtub rings" that symbolize the current
crisis.
The mismatch of supplies and demands, however, is not
merely a climatic or hydrologic phenomenon, but is also closely
associated with water demands.48 Ironically, the onset of drought
conditions near the start of the 2 1st century largely obscured the fact
that, at roughly the same time, demands on the mainstem from Upper
and Lower Basin deliveries (and associated reservoir evaporation
losses) consistently topped 15 MAF. 4 9  And despite the fact that
average demands on the system already equal (if not exceed) average
(non-drought) supplies, projections call for additional consumption
upstream. The current Upper Basin depletion schedules call for an
increase from 4.0 to 6.1 MAF/year from 2005 to 2055. '
45. See e.g. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, supra n. 39; Christensen, supra
n. 39; Christensen & Lettenmaier, supra n. 39; Bureau of Reclamation Climate
Technical Work Group, Harding et al., Hydrologic Impacts on the Human-Made
River: The Colorado River Network Model, in Coping with Severe Sustained
Drought in the Southwestern United States, Phase II Report (1995); Nash and
Gleick, supra n. 39.
46. Christensen, supra n. 39, at 353.
47. Kenney, supra n. 35, at 65.
48. Id. at 4-5.
49. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Colorado River System Consumptive
Uses and Losses Report: 1996-2000 (2004).
50. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, supra n. 25, at Appendix C.
51. This information was provided by the Bureau of Reclamation but is
currently being revisited (but not likely modified) as part of an ongoing effort
called the Colorado River Basin Water Supply and Demand Study (or simply the
"Basin Study"), which is a two year effort led jointly by the Bureau of Reclamation
and the basin states. The $2 million study is examining water supply and demand
imbalances in the basin between now and 2060, and will include a review of
potential adaption and mitigation strategies to address those imbalances. The Basin
Study will be complemented by another study conducted by the USGS called the
Colorado River Basin Geographic Focus Study. The USGS study will be
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II. THE COLLISION OF LAW AND HYDROLOGY
Current levels of consumption in the basin are likely
unsustainable. Considering projected demands alongside climatic
and hydrologic projections suggests a collision of law and hydrology
may be inevitable. After all, none of the Colorado River states (or
Mexico) currently use more water than they are allocated under the
Law of the River and, furthermore, none are projected to do so under
any of the depletion schedules used for planning purposes. 52 The
problem, thus, is not simply one of legal enforcement but rather of
inferring priorities and curtailment schedules from documents that
were not established for that explicit purpose. As noted below, the
most commonly postulated legal interpretations are apt to work to the
detriment of the Upper Basin states.
A. The Upper Basin Climate Change Squeeze
The so-called "Upper Basin climate change squeeze" refers to
the observation that the Upper Basin apportionment is essentially the
last priority on the river.53 As average flow volumes decline, this
apportionment likely bears the full brunt of the "squeeze" of reduced
water availability. 54 The legal arguments that lead to this conclusion
are explored in more detail in the following section. For now, it is
sufficient to state that the Compact and, to a lesser extent, the Treaty
with Mexico, combine to make the Upper Basin apportionment the
conducted over a three-year period and will attempt to identify how much water is
demanded from the Colorado River Basin, including water to support ecosystems.
For additional information, see the Basin Study website and Department of Interior
press release: See Bureau of Reclamation, Colorado River Basin Water Supply and
Demand Study (last updated Feb. 2011) (available at http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region
/programs/crbstudy.html); U.S. Dept. of the Int., Secretary Salazar Launches New
Regional Climate Science Center and Water Census at Meeting of Colorado River




52. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, supra n. 25, at Appendix C, D.
53. Kenney, supra n. 35, at 13.
54. Id.
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lowest priority on the river, even though the Compact was initially
pursued as a mechanism to ensure that the priority system was not
implemented across state lines.
The Upper Basin apportionment of 7.5 MAF described in
Article 111(d) of the Compact has long been understood to be
unrealistic, forcing Upper Basin planners to reluctantly assume a
"practical" apportionment no higher than 6 MAF.56  Given climate
change estimates, even this figure now seems unrealistically high.
Analysis done by the Colorado River Governance Initiative
("CRGI") suggests that, given typical (but certainly debatable) legal
assumptions, and the 10 to 30% flow reductions by mid-century58
that are expected to accompany climate change, water availability for
the Upper Basin could drop to roughly 5.3 to 2.3 MAF/year,
respectively. 59  Provisional data provided by the Bureau of
Reclamation suggests current Upper Basin consumption levels of
roughly 4.3 MAF,60 which according to the CRGI analysis, is
roughly what the Upper Basin could expect under a 12.5 MAF Lee
Ferry flow scenario (a 17% reduction from 15 MAF).61  In other
55. In Wyoming v. Colorado, decided during the Compact negotiations,
the Court held that the rule of prior appropriation applied to interstate stream
allocations between two prior appropriation states. 259 U.S. 419, 470 (1922).
Lower Basin states were delighted that prior appropriation would apply interstate,
because many of.their diversions had the earliest priority dates. Meanwhile, Upper
Basin states were concerned that Wyoming v. Colorado would leave their right to
develop water in the future unprotected as well as discourage the Lower Basin from
compromising in the Compact. Hundley, Water and the West: The Colorado River
Compact and the Politics of Water in the American West, supra n. 6, at 177-180.
56. Among the first prominent studies to articulate a reduced Upper Basin
apportionment was the report by Tipton and Kalbach Inc. (1965). That report
examined a variety of different scenarios based on different Upper Basin storage
capacities, delivery requirements, and evaporative losses, and estimated Upper
Basin water availability to range from 4.7 to 6.3 MAF. Scott Tipton, Water
Supplies of the Colorado River: Available for Use by the States of the Upper
Division and for Use from the Main Stem by the States of Arizona, California, and
Nevada in the Lower Basin 18-21 (Tipton and Kalmbach, Inc. 1965).
57. Barnett, supra n. 42, at 4-5.
58. Id
59. Kenney, supra n. 35, at 17.
60. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Provisional Upper Colorado River
Basin Consumptive Uses and Losses Report: 2006-2010 iv 14 (2010).
61. Kenney, supra n. 35, at 17.
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words, a relatively modest climate change scenario suggests that in
40 years, the practical (useable) Upper Basin apportionment would
equal roughly half of its use a decade ago at the turn of the century.
The more extreme flow reduction scenario (30%) restricts the Upper
62Basin to about 2.3 MAF, roughly equivalent to estimates of the
Upper Basin's Present Perfected Rights ("PPRs")-i.e., the amount
of water consumed in the region in the 1920s.63 It is difficult to
imagine restricting the Upper Basin to this level of use without
significant political and legal wrangling.
B. Omissions and Ambiguities in the Law of the River
The above analysis hinges on one possible interpretation of the
Law of the River, which not only features troubling contradictions
and inconsistencies, but numerous omissions and ambiguities that
provide potentially fertile ground for legal disputes. Five issues are
reviewed below, as they have particular salience to the interbasin
apportionment:
* ISSUE 1: The Upper Basin Delivery Obligation
* ISSUE 2: The Interbasin Apportionment
62. Id.
63. For a contemporaneous estimate of use in the Upper and Lower
Basins, see Colorado River Commission, Record and Minutes of the Sixth Meeting
of the Colorado River Commission 69-70 (Jan. 30, 1922) [hereinafter "1 Record"].
There remains some debate as to the magnitude of Present Perfected Rights
("PPRs"). Part of the problem is the inadequacy of consumption records from the
1920s. However, there is also a legal issue; namely, are PPRs those with a priority
date prior to the signing of the Colorado River Compact (Nov. 24, 1922), or prior
to the effective date of its ratification in the Boulder Canyon Project Act (June 25,
1929)? The Upper Colorado Basin Compact (1948) states that rights in the Upper
Basin must have been perfected prior to November 24, 1922. Upper Colorado
Basin Compact, supra n. 20, at art. IV(c). However, the Supreme Court in Arizona
v. California, held that the PPRs in the Lower Basin include water appropriated
prior to the adoption of the Boulder Canyon Project Act on June 25, 1929. 547
U.S. at 154. Two Upper Basin states, New Mexico and Utah, share Lower Basin
tributaries, and were thus involved in the Arizona v. California litigation. For those
states, it is unclear if their PPRs are determined by the 1922 or the 1929 dates.
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* ISSUE 3: Deliveries to Mexico
* ISSUE 4: Administration of Compact Calls
* ISSUE 5: Compact Rescission or Reformation
ISSUE 1: The Upper Basin Delivery Obligation
The common categorization of the Upper Basin
apportionment as being the last priority on the river is a delicate
issue, but is based largely on the workings of Article 111(d). This
section requires "the States of the Upper Division [to] not cause the
flow of the river at Lee Ferry to be depleted below an aggregate of
75,000,000 acre-feet for any period of ten consecutive years." 64 At
issue is whether the prohibition on the states of the Upper Division
from depleting flows below 75 MAF/10 years operates as a delivery
requirement or if it acts as an obligation not to deplete flows. A
delivery obligation would make water rights held by the Lower Basin
senior to those held by the Upper Basin. An obligation not to deplete
may have the same effect on priority, which then begs the question as
to whether these are practicably different.
From the language of the Compact and other Law of the
River components, most commentators adopted the working
assumption that Article 111(d) operates as a de facto delivery
requirement in favor of the Lower Division states, not just a division
of available water.65 Language in the Compact confines the behavior
of the Upper Division states. The Compact states that the Upper
Basin "will not cause the flow . . . to be depleted" 66 and "shall not
64. Compact, supra n. 8, at art. 111(d).
65. There is a significant literature reviewing how the Law of the River
prioritizes allocations. For example, see Lawrence MacDonnell et al., Coping with
Severe, Sustained Drought in the Southwestern United States (1995); Edward W.
Clyde, Present Conflicts on the Colorado River, 32 Rocky Mtn. L. Rev. 534, 535-
536 (1960); Douglas Grant, Interstate Water Allocation: When the Virtue of
Permanence Becomes the Vice of Inflexibility, 74 U. Colo. L. Rev. 105, 114-121
(2003); John U. Carlson & Alan E. Boles, Jr., Contrary Views of the Law of the
Colorado River: An Examination of Rivalries Between the Upper and Lower
Basins, 32 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. 21-7 (1986); and Glenn Saunders, Reflections
on Sixty Years of Water Law Practice, 2 U. Denver Water L. Rev. 1, 22-23 (1998).
As noted, most categorize the Upper Basin as having a delivery obligation (and
thus a junior priority) to the Lower Basin.
66. Compact, supra n. 8, at art. 111(d).
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withhold water. . . ."67 from the Lower Basin. Furthermore,
Congressional testimony of Herbert Hoover, the federal
representative in the Compact negotiations, noted that "in the
improbable event of a deficiency, the lower basin has the first call on
the water up to a total of 75,000,000 acre-feet each 10 years." 68 The
Upper Colorado River Basin Compact ("UCRBC") uses both the
"not to deplete" and "delivery obligation" language, but ultimately
seems to accept the delivery obligation interpretation. 69 Additionally,
rules promulgated under federal legislation about reservoir operations
emphasize a delivery obligation. 70  Several academic studies also
emphasize the delivery requirement. For example, a two-phase
study, entitled "Coping with Severe and Sustained Drought in the
Southwestern United States," stated that "only after the full Lower
Division obligation has been met can the Upper Division begin to
satisfy" post-1922 demands in a time of drought.71
67. Id. at art. III(e).
68. 64 Cong. Rec. 2710 (1923); see also H.R. Doc. 717, 80th Cong., 2d
Sess. A125 (1948). Kuhn, supra n. 29, at 169-170 (Colo. River Water Conserv.
Bd. 2007); Carlson & Boles, supra n. 66, at 51-56. However, Hoover's testimony
must be considered in context. Hoover was responding to questions from an
Arizona congressman, Carl Hayden. At the time, Arizona had not ratified the
compact and hostilities were developing in Arizona towards it. Hoover was well
aware of the hostility and had gone out of his way to campaign for its ratification.
Hoover's testimony, then, may be less supportive of the delivery obligation
requirement when considering the context in which it was made. Id. at 21-38.
69. The UCRBC uses the obligation not to "deplete" when describing the
Yampa, but speaks of obligations to "deliver" water when referring to the Colorado
mainstem. Upper Colorado River Compact, supra n. 20, at art. IV, art. XIII.
70. Dept. of Int., Criteria for Coordinated Long-Range Operation of
Colorado River Reservoirs Pursuant to the Colorado River Basin Project Act of
September 30, 1968 (1970); see Colorado River Basin Project Act, supra n. 24, at §
602(b).
71. William Lord et al., Managing the Colorado River in a Severe
Sustained Drought: An Evaluation of Institutional Options, 31 Water Res. Bulletin
939, 943 (1995); see also David Wegner, Environmental Restoration: Challenges
for the New Millennium: Looking Towards the Future: The Time has Come to
Restore Glen Canyon, 42 Ariz. L. Rev. 239 (2000); and David Getches, Colorado
River Governance: Sharing Federal Authority as an Incentive to Create a New
Institution, 68 U. Colo. L. Rev. 573 (1997).
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Despite this body of evidence supporting the "delivery
obligation" interpretation, the Compact does not use delivery
obligation terminology, and this fact may be increasingly important
in an era of climate change. For example, one analyst argues that if
flows are reduced by a "natural force" such as climate change rather
than by Upper Basin consumption, then mitigating that decline in
flows is not the responsibility of the Upper Basin; it was not the
Upper Basin that depleted the flows. As discussed below, the
delivery obligation argument could potentially be married to the
debate about whether the Commissioners intended the Compact to
provide an "equitable" and/or an "equal" division of water; under
either interpretation, it can be argued that the Upper Basin should not
bear the full brunt of climate change flow reductions.
ISSUE 2: The Interbasin Apportionment
The purpose of the Colorado River Compact is to "provide for
the equitable division and apportionment of the use of the waters of
the Colorado River System." 73 But does "equitable" mean "equal?"
The language of Article 111(a) would suggest it does: "There is
hereby apportioned from the Colorado River System in perpetuity to
the Upper Basin and to the Lower Basin, respectively, the exclusive
beneficial consumptive use of 7,500,000 acre-feet of water per
annum, which shall include all water necessary for the supply of any
rights which now may exist."74  Yet, if the Upper Basin
apportionment is, due to a de facto delivery obligation, junior to the
Lower Basin, it is expected to lag far behind that of the Lower Basin.
Reconciling Article 111(a) and 111(d) is likely to be a point of
frustration, if not litigation, under even modest climate change
scenarios.75
In determining whether the Commissioners intended to
"equally" divide the river, it is necessary to review the Compact
negotiations, and to remember that they took place against a
background of Supreme Court litigation that framed the Compact
72. Kuhn, supra n. 29, at 78.
73. Compact, supra n. 8, at art. 1.
74. Id. at art. 111(a).




allocations. In Kansas v. Colorado, the Court first announced the
doctrine of "equitable apportionment," 77  explaining that the
underlying rule is "equality of right,"78 not equality of
apportionment. 79  Accordingly, during the Compact negotiations,
reference to "equitable apportionment" did not necessarily mean
division of the Colorado River into equal amounts. Rather, the
Commissioners would consider the rights of each state equally and
ensure that the ensuing allocation was just and fair.
At the time of Compact negotiation, the Commissioners
projected that future water needs of each Basin would be roughly
equal.80 This fact, when balanced against the negotiating leverage of
each party, prompted Delph Carpenter of Colorado to propose an
equal division between the basins81 . Specifically, he suggested that
each division receive 8.7 MAF per year from the Colorado River
water, with the Lower Basin apportionment including water from
their tributaries.82 An equal division would preserve the right of the
Upper Basin to develop in the future, but also provide the Lower
Basin with ample current supplies.83  Carpenter hoped his formula
would establish "a permanent and perpetual status" between the
76. See Hundley, Water and the West: The Colorado River Compact and
the Politics of Water in the American West, supra n. 6, at 180.
77. Kan. v. Colo., 206 U.S. 46, 98 (1907) (Each state is on the same level
in the legal system as the other state, and has the same powers and rights under the
Constitution and interstate disputes are settled in such a manner that recognizes
"the equal rights of both and at the same time establish[es] justice between them").
78. Id. at 97.
79. Id. at 97-98.
80. The Upper Basin's present and future needs from the mainstem were
approximately 6.3 to 6.8 MAF per year, while the Lower Basin required between
5.1 to 6.1 MAF per year. See 1 Record, supra n. 64, Sess. No. 6, at 70-79; 1
Record, supra n. 64, Sess. No. 11, at 61; 1 Record, supra n. 64, Sess. No. 12, at 11;
1 Record, supra n. 64, Sess. No. 14, at 40-41; 1 Record, supra n. 64, Sess. No. 15,
at 29-30; 1 Record, supra n. 64, Sess. No. 16, at 21-24; 1 Record, supra n. 64, Sess.
No. 17, at 7; 2 Record, supra n. 64, Sess. No. 20, at 62.
81. 1 Record, supra n. 64, Sess. No, 11, at 20.
82. Id. at 14-23. This means the Upper Basin would deliver 6.264 MAF
per year at Lee Ferry.
83. 1 Record, supra n. 64, Sess. No. 24, at 233.
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basins.84 Response to his proposal was largely, but not universally,
positive.85  The most vehement opponent was W.S. Norviel from
Arizona, who thought the Lower Basin should receive half of the
mainstem water plus exclusive use of the Lower Basin tributaries. 86
Back and forth negotiations ensued.8 7  The negotiations seemed to
stall as the Lower Basin, led by Norviel, insisted on receiving 82
MAF every ten years, while the Upper Basin refused to deliver more
than 65 MAF every ten years.8 8
In the face of the impasse, Herbert Hoover presented a memo
compiling the basic principles of the Compact, which stated,
"appropriations may be made in either division with equality of right
as between them, up to a total of 7,500,000 acre-feet per annum, for
each division." 89 Furthermore, Hoover proposed that in any future
compact revisions, "an increasing amount of water to one division
will carry automatically an increase in the rights of the other basin." 90
Hoover's statements, coupled with those of other neotiators,
indicate that the Basins intended to share the flow equally. 1 Equal
84. Hundley, Water and the West: The Colorado River Compact and the
Politics of Water in the American West, supra n. 6, at 185; see also Ltr. From
Delph Carpenter to Frank Emerson (Aug. 19, 1922), in Papers of the Wyoming
State Engineer.
85. While the commissioners of California and Nevada opposed some
details, they supported the basic equal apportionment scheme. McClure from
California considered the proposal to be a "fair basis for discussion." I Record,
supra n. 64, Sess. No. 12 at 22-23.
86. 1 Record, supra n. 64, Sess. No. 16 at 25; 1 Record, supra n. 64, Sess.
No. 17 at 2-6, 10-25.
87. Hundley, Water and the West: The Colorado River Compact and the
Politics of Water in the American West, supra n. 6, at 191-195.
88. The proposed delivery of 82,000,000 MAF every ten years
constituted a much higher delivery than the Upper Basin was willing to make due
to concern that in low flow years it would be unable to meet the delivery without
curtailing its own users. Stephen Davis from New Mexico pointed out that "taking
the measured flow for the lowest ten years for which we have a record... it is
apparent.. .that... any such guaranty would have been violated." 1 Record, supra n.
64, Sess. No. 17 at 2. See also Hundley, Water and the West: The Colorado River
Compact and the Politics of Water in the American West, supra n. 6, at 191-195.
89. 1 Record, supra n. 64, Sess. No. 17, at 23.
90. 1 Record, supra n. 64, Sess. No. 18, at 32.
91. Hundley, Water and the West: The Colorado River Compact and the
Politics of Water in the American West, supra n. 6, at 195-99; Carlson & Boles,
supra n. 66, at 48.
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allocations would carry equal priorities. However, this exact
language did not end up in the final draft.
Other language in the Compact further supports the concept
of equal shares. The inclusion of Article 111(b) (providing the Lower
Basin with an additional 1 MAF as available), as the sole exception
to equal division, implies that the commissioners intended to equally
divide the Colorado River System between the Basins.92
Additionally (and as discussed later), in Article 111(c), the burden of
Mexican delivery when surplus water proves inadequate is to be
"equally borne by the Upper Basin and the Lower Basin, and
whenever necessary the States of the Upper Division shall
deliver... .water to supply one-half of the deficiency." 93  The
language emphasizes that drafters intended each Basin to bear the
Mexican burden equally during non-surplus conditions, in
accordance with the basic concept of equal allocation of the Colorado
River. But this language is largely offset by other Compact elements
that revert back to the "equitable apportionment" terminology, which
suggests the intention was not equality of allocations, but is simply a
recognition of the states' equal rights to the Colorado River (as
articulated in Kansas v. Colorado94). The equal rights interpretation
is reinforced by Articles 111(f) and 111(g) concerning future
appropriations of unallocated waters.95
In summary, it is unclear if the Commissioners intended
"equitable" to mean "equal," and if so, what remedies might be
available to address the growing imbalance in the allocation between
92. Carlson & Boles, supra n. 66, at ch. 21, 46, 50-52. Article 111(b) was
included to provide an additional 1.0 MAF to the Lower Basin to offset the
inclusion of its tributaries in the Compact allocations. Hundley, Water and the
West: The Colorado River Compact and the Politics of Water in the American
West, supra n. 6, at 198-203.
93. Compact, supra n. 8, at art. 111(c).
94. Kan. v. Colo., 206 U.S. 46, 98 (1907).
95. Article 111(f) provides for "further equitable apportionment of the
beneficial uses of the waters of the Colorado River System unapportioned by
paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) may be made in the manner provided in paragraph
(g)..." Article III (g) provides that future representatives making apportionments
should "divide and apportion equitably between the Upper Basin and Lower
Basin." Compact, supra n. 8, at art. 1II(f)-(g).
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the Upper and Lower Basins. What is clear is that this issue will only
grow in importance, and that the resolution of this issue could
potentially involve significant, protracted litigation.
ISSUE 3: Deliveries to Mexico
As provided by Article X of the 1944 Treaty with Mexico, the
United States must annually deliver to Mexico 1.5 MAF (or 1.7 MAF
96in surplus years). This obligation is clear and uncontroversial in
years where there is an abundance of water; however, during scarcity,
numerous legal ambiguities exist.97 Two are of particular concern
and are discussed below: the Upper Basin's delivery obligation to
Mexico, and the definition of extraordinary drought.
The Upper Basin's Mexican Treaty Obligation
According to the Colorado River Compact, deliveries to
Mexico are to be made from water that is "surplus over and above the
aggregate of the quantities specified in paragraphs (a) and (b); and if
such surplus shall prove insufficient for this purpose, then, the burden
of such a deficiency shall be equally borne by the Upper Basin and
the Lower Basin." 98 When there is no "surplus" water, the Upper
Basin must bear one half of the deficiency-up 750,000 AF per
year. 99 When combined with the Article 111(d) de facto delivery
obligation to the Lower Basin, the Upper Basin delivers a minimum
of 8.23 MAF/year at Lee Ferry, and perhaps more if compensation
for transit losses is required.100 In periods of scarcity, this could
96. Treaty with Mexico, supra n. 19. Several important minutes
(amendments) have been made that somewhat modify this agreement, but are
omitted from this discussion.
97. Norris Hundley, Jr., Dividing the Waters: A Century of Controversy
Between the United States and Mexico (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1966).
98. Compact, supra n. 8, at art. 111(c).
99. Id at art. 111(c).
100. The 8.23 MAF/year figure is a prominent element of river
management, and is the typical minimum release from Lake Powell. See e.g.
Bureau of Reclamation, supra n. 25 at 15. Presumably, it is comprised of 7.5
MAF, which is the average annual delivery requirement from Article 111(d), and
750,000 AF for the Upper Basin's potential share (as discussed above) of the
Mexican obligation. This totals 8.25 MAF; the actual release from Lake Powell is
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result in curtailment of both Upper and Lower Basin users. Given
this fact, the definition of surplus is critically important. In short,
Lower Basin interests typically contend that there is no surplus and
the Upper Basin's annual share of the Mexican treaty delivery
obligation is therefore, at least, one-half of the total obligation of 1.5
MAF. The Upper Basin States believe that surplus water exists in
the Lower Basin and therefore they are not required to release any
water to meet the Mexican treaty obligation.10 2
Determining the existence of surplus water is tied to the status
of the Lower Basin tributaries under the Compact.'o3 Specifically,
the issue is whether or not the Lower Basin tributaries are part of the
Compact apportionment, or whether they are separate.104 The
tributaries are included in the Compact's definition of "Colorado
River System" 05 and the inclusion of the extra 1 MAF in the Lower
Basin apportionment (in Article 111(b)) was viewed as compensation
to the Lower Basin for including the tributaries in the
apportionment.106 However, while the Supreme Court in Arizona v.
California recognized that tributary inclusion was the original intent
of Compact negotiators, it noted that subsequent legislative history
and the alternative proposals that eventually culminated in the
Boulder Canyon Project Act "consistently provided for division of
the mainstream only, reserving the tributaries to each State's
exclusive use."1 07
20,000 AF lower, which is accounted for by inflows from the Paria River, which is
downstream of Lake Powell but before the official Lee Ferry point.
101. Carlson, supra n. 32, at 12-13 (quoting Report to Congress of
Comptroller General (May 4, 1979)).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 14-15.
104. Id.
105. Compact, supra n. 8, at art. 11(a).
106. Hundley, Water and the West: The Colorado River Compact and the
Politics of Water in the American West, supra n. 6, at 197-201. Article 111(b) was
inserted to placate Norviel of Arizona who unsuccessfully argued against the
inclusion of tributaries in the Compact. 1 Record, supra n. 64, Sess. No. 19, at 4-8;
1 Record, supra n. 64, Sess. No. 21, at 15; and 1 Record, supra n. 64, Sess. No. 23,
at 3.
107. Ariz. v. Cal., 373 U.S. at 569. The Court held that the Boulder
Canyon Project Act effectively enacted a congressional apportionment of mainstem
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The Court's decision to disregard the tributaries is an ongoing
concern in the Upper Basin. os Particularly, the Upper Basin
contends that, once the 1 MAF threshold of Lower Basin tributary
use is surpassed, then the remainder of those tributary flows is
"surplus" water that, first and foremost, should be used to satisfy the
Mexican obligation.10 9 The Lower Basin, meanwhile, contends that
all Lower Basin tributary use-even that in excess of 1 MAF-is
exempt from the Compact apportionment, and thus both the Upper
and Lower Basins should split the Mexican apportionment out of
mainstem apportionments. 10 The distinction is important, as the
Bureau of Reclamation estimates that Lower Basin tributary flows,
while poorly measured, average at least 2.5 MAF/year (and are
perhaps as high as 4.5 MAF).I''
Since the definition of "surplus" does not include tributary
flow, the Upper Basin must bear a larger portion of Mexican
deliveries than initially expected.112 The Upper Basin's burden
increases further if the Lower Basin's argument is correct. The
Lower Basin argues that the Upper Basin must also compensate for
transit losses occurring between Lee Ferry and the Mexican
boundary. 113  However, this does not appear to be the Compact
negotiators' intention;11 4 the Compact states only that the Upper
Basin shall deliver water to Lee Ferry.115
river water "based on congressional intent and the Act's delegation of authority to
the Secretary of the Interior to allocate and distribute water through contracts."
Lochhead, supra n. 6, at 311.
108. This issue is discussed by several commentators, including Carlson,
supra n. 32, and Getches, supra n. 6.
109. Carlson & Boles, supra n. 66, at 21-58; Carlson, supra n. 32, at 14-
15; see Kuhn, supra n. 29, at 78-83.
110. Carlson & Boles, supra n. 66, at 21-29; see also Hundley, Water and
the West: The Colorado River Compact and the Politics of Water in the American
West, supra n. 6, at 309.
111. Carlson, supra n. 32 at 14. Lower Basin tributary consumptive use
was 5.2 MAF in 1981, but the 5 year average for this period (1981-1985) was only
4.4 MAF. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Colorado River System Consumptive Uses
and Losses Report: 1986-1990 25 (1998).
112. See Carlson, supra n. 32, at 11.
113. Id. at 12-13, 20-21.
114. 1 Record, supra n. 64, Sess. No. 16, at 26; 1 Record, supra n. 64,
Sess. No. 20, at 60.
115. Carlson, supra n. 32, at 20-21.
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What is Extraordinary Drought?
Further complicating the issue is the observation that, while
the Mexican Treaty obligation generally controls the river's delivery
priority,l16 Article X of the Treaty provides that:
"[In] the event of extraordinary drought or serious
accident to the irrigation system in the United States,
thereby making it difficult for the United States to
deliver the guaranteed quantity of 1,500,000 acre-
feet... a year, the water allotted to Mexico under
subparagraph (a) of this Article will be reduced in the
same proportion as consumptive uses in the United
States are reduced."' 17
The term "extraordinary drought" is not defined in the 1944
Treaty nor is it defined in any parallel agreement.' 8 Nevertheless,
the term appears in Article V of the Treaty, which provides for
Mexican deliveries on the Rio Grande to users in the United States.l19
During a prolonged drought in the 1990s, Mexico claimed it suffered
an extraordinary drought along the Rio Grande and failed to deliver
sufficient water to irrigation districts in the United States. 120 Its
invocation of extraordinary drought was controversial, and similar
116. Getches, supra n. 6, at 826.
117. Treaty with Mexico, supra n. 19, at art. X.
118. Id. at 826-827.
119. There are, however, some differences between the use of
extraordinary drought in Article X and Article V. Article X says that deliveries to
Mexico will be decreased in proportion to consumptive use decreases in the United
States. Article V permits Mexico to deliver less water for five years, but requires it
to make up delivery deficiencies in the next five-year cycle. Treaty with Mexico,
supra n. 19, at Art. V, Art. X.
120. Stephen Vifia, The United States-Mexico Dispute over the Waters of
the Lower Rio Grande River, Congressional Research Service 3-4 (Mar. 21, 2005)
(available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RS22085_20050321 .pdf).
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disagreements are likely to occur should the U.S. declare
extraordinary drought on the Colorado River.121
The 2007 EIS discusses the magnitude and timing of basin-
wide curtailments during periods of scarcity, including an assessment
of the Mexican priority. 12 2 Generally, if Lake Mead elevations drop
enough to trigger shortages in Lower Basin deliveries, then the
Secretary of the Interior shall consult the Department of State, the
USIBWC,123 and the Basin States to determine whether and how the
United States should reduce deliveries to Mexico consistent with the
1944 Treaty.' 24 While the EIS includes some assumptions about
possible levels and timings of curtailments, Mexico did not approve
the scenarios presented, and the curtailments await completion of
ongoing international negotiations.125
121. In the 1990s, the Rio Grande Basin in Mexico experienced a severe
drought that caused Mexico to miss required deliveries. Mexico claimed
extraordinary drought, and, under Article V, obtained the ability to make up
deliveries in the next five-year period. Texans reliant on the water claimed the
basin's growth in Mexico and Mexican storage of Rio Grande water was to blame
instead of the drought. Mass. Inst. of Tech., Mission 2012: Clean Water, Rio
Grande Debt Due to Extraordinary Drought,
http:// web.mit.edu/12.000/www/m2012/finalwebsite/problem/intemational.shtml;
U.S. Water News, Satellite Data Show Mexico can no Longer Claim Drought,
Researcher Says, http://www.uswaternews.com/archives/arcglobal12satdatl0.html
(2002).
122. Current thinking on curtailment is that the Upper Basin would be
curtailed first. Not until only present perfected right remained in the Upper Basin,
would cutbacks begin in the Lower Basin. The Secretary would first curtail CAP,
then Nevada and Arizona's non-CAP water, and finally California. Getches, supra
n. 6, at 830.
123. The USIBWC is the United States section of the International
Boundary and Water Commission ("IBWC"), the bi-national organization
responsible for administration of the 1944 Treaty.
124. Robert Adler, Revisiting the Colorado River Compact: Time for a
Change?, 28 J. Land Resources & Envtl. L. 19 (2008).
125. In furtherance of this agreement, on June 17, 2010, the U.S. and
Mexican representatives to the IBWC signed the Conceptual Framework for U.S.-
Mexico Discussions on Colorado River Cooperative Actions, also known as Minute
317. Intl. Boundary & Water Commn., Framework for U.S.-Mexico Discussions
on Colorado River Cooperative Actions (June 17, 2010).
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ISSUE 4: Administration of Compact Calls
Under the prior-appropriation system, a senior appropriator
will place a "call" on a river when flows in the river are insufficient
to satisfy all rights on a river.126  The "call" forces junior
appropriators to stop diverting until the senior's water right is
satisfied.127 There are two possible types of interstate calls on the
Colorado River, neither or which has ever happened: a Lower Basin
call against the Upper Basin, and an intra-Upper Basin call amongst
two or more Upper Basin states.128 A Lower Basin call would only
occur when, due to nearly empty reservoirs and severe low flows in
the Colorado River, the Upper Basin fails to meet either its Article
111(d) flow requirements or its Article 111(c) deliveries to Mexico.129
In an Upper Basin call, one Upper Basin state would make a call on
another Upper Basin state, perhaps as part of efforts to comply with a
Lower Basin call.' 30
Administration of a basinwide call may entail at least three
contentious and phased efforts.' 3 ' First, a call between the Upper and
Lower Basin would require an assessment of the magnitude and
timing of downstream deliveries required to bring the Upper Basin
back in compliance with the Compactl32. Second, a system of
reservoir releases and user curtailments would need to be allocated
126. Bureau of Land Management, Water Appropriation Systems: Prior
Appropriation (2010) (available at http://www.blm.gov /nstc/WaterLaws/
appsystems.html).
127. Id. A call is a "request by an appropriator for water which the person
is entitled to under his decree; such a call will force those users with junior decrees
to cease or diminish their diversions and pass the requested amount of water to the
downstream senior making the call." R. Waskom and M. Neibauer, Glossary of
Water Terminology, Colorado State Extension (2008) (available at
http://www.ext.colostate.edu/pubs/crops/04717.html).
128. MacDonnell, supra n. 66, at 831.
129. David Getches, Performance of Legal and Institutional Systems in
Drought, in Severe, Sustained Drought in the Southwestern United States: Phase 1
(Getches, ed.) 100-101 (1991).
130. Id. at 101.
131. Id. at 102-106.
132. Id. at 100.
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among the Upper Basin states, presumably using the rules featured in
the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact.133 And third, state water
officials would need to devise and enforce curtailments within each
state. 134
Every aspect of every stage figures to be filled with
bitterness, data deficiencies, and legal challenges.' 35  Determining
whether or not the Upper Basin is out of compliance with the
Compact is perhaps the most salient of the issues, as it could require
resolution of several of the legal omissions and ambiguities already
discussed.136 If there is any doubt among Upper Basin interests as to
the validity of whether or not a Compact violation exists, Upper
Basin water officials would likely be hesitant to implement a call-
especially considering the fact that an interbasin call could be
requested in a period when Lower Basin uses are already
significantly higher than those in the Upper Basin.' 3 7 Should Upper
Basin interests concede that an interbasin call is warranted,
interpreting the language in the Upper Colorado River Basin
Compact ("UCRBC") then becomes a central issue. 138 The UCRBC
requires that any of the Upper Basin states that used, in the ten years
prior to curtailment, more water than they were entitled under the
Compacts must supply the overdraft to Lee Ferry before any other
state faces curtailment.' 39 If there is no overdraft, then the UCRBC is
133. Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, supra n. 20, at art. IV.
134. MacDonnell, supra n. 66, at 831.
135. Hundley, Water and the West: The Colorado River Compact and the
Politics of Water in the American West, supra n. 6, at 352.
136. Getches, supra n. 130, at 101.
137. It's worth noting that the Secretary of the Interior is, essentially, the
river master for the Lower Basin, but likely does not have the same breadth of legal
authority over the Upper Basin. Gregory Hobbs, Upper Colorado River Basin
Compact: Sharing the Shortage, 32 Wyo. Lawyer 1 (2009). This conclusion is
based on the Arizona v. California litigation. Likewise, the unanimity rule that
surrounds existing mechanisms of interstate negotiation is likely to be poorly suited
to such an obvious zero-sum conflict. For more information on the resolution of
interstate river conflicts, see Edella Schlager & Tanya Heikkila, Resolving Water
Conflicts: A Comparative Analysis of Interstate River Compacts, 37 Policy Studies
J. 367 (2009).
138. Larry MacDonnell, Law of the Colorado River: Coping with Severe,
Sustained Drought, in Coping with Severe, Sustained Drought in the Southwestern
United States (Robert Young, ed.) 4-9 (1994).
139. Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, supra n. 20, at art. IV(b).
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less clear about curtailment.140 There are two different theories as to
how curtailment rules apply: curtailments are proportional to
consumptive uses in the prior year' 4 1 or curtailments are proportional
to apportionment percentages within the UCRBC.142 Under the
consumptive use interpretation, each Upper Basin state must deliver
to Lee Ferry an amount of water that is proportional to their
consumptive use in the preceding water year divided by the total
consumptive use in that same year in the entire Upper Basin.143
Under the apportionment interpretation, each state must curtail its use
based on its allocation in the UCRBC, not its consumption in the
prior water year.144  The Commission has yet to formally endorse
either interpretation, but unanimously adopted a resolution in
December of 2010 to "work with the Upper Division states'
representatives to develop options for implementing articles III
through VI of the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact and provide
a recommendation for consideration by the Commission as soon as
140. Id. at art. IV(c). The UCRBC specifically references curtailment
procedures on the Little Snake River (Art. XI), Henry's Fork of the Green River
(Art. XII), the Yampa River (Art. XIII), and the San Juan River (Art. XIV). It is
unclear how these curtailment procedures fit in with curtailment procedures in the
Upper Division as a whole. Id.
141. Pat Tyrrell, the current Wyoming State Engineer, stated that "the
curtailment by each State is to be proportionate to the [consumptive use] of Upper
Colorado River System water made by each State during the water year
immediately preceding the year in which the curtailment becomes necessary." Pat
Tyrrell, Wyo. St. Engr. Off., Colorado River Compact Administration Program:
Consumptive Use Determination Plan, 3 (Jan. 2008) (available at
http://seo.state.wy.us/PDF/CUPlan Final.pdf). This testimony is similar to that of
Tipton during the Compact hearings (in 1949), in which he concludes that, during
curtailment, the states will take a cut in "proportion to the amount they are using,
not in proportion to their apportionment." The Upper Colorado River Basin
Compact Hearing, 81st Cong. 38 (1949).
142. Hobbs, supra n. 138, at 1.
143. Steve Wolff, Colorado River Compact Administration Project,
Wyoming State Engineers Office (2006) (available at
http://seo.state.wy.us/Forum/2006/Wolff%/2012-06.ppt).
144. Gregory Hobbs, a current Colorado Supreme Court Justice, supports
this interpretation. Hobbs, supra n. 138, at 2.
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practicable but, in no event, later than December 31, 2013."l'4
Regardless of the approach used, the magnitude of curtailments for
each Upper Basin state must be sufficient to result in the required
delivery to Lee Ferry.146 Once this step is completed, "it will be up
to the individual states as to the particular uses that will be curtailed
to take care of the obligation."l 4  In recent years, each Upper Basin
state worked to promulgate curtailment rules.148
ISSUE 5: Compact Rescission or Reformation
Perhaps the most disconcerting of the potential legal conflicts
are those that could result in rescission or reformation of the
Compact. As noted earlier, the Colorado River Compact apportioned
145. Upper Colorado River Commission, Resolution of the Upper
Colorado River Commission: Regarding the Development of Policies and
Procedures for Implementing Curtailments of Water Use Pursuant to Article IV of
the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact 1 (2011).
146. Upper Colorado River Compact, supra n. 20, at art. IV.
147. The Upper Colorado River Basin Compact: Hearing on H.R. 2325,
H.R. 2336, H.R. 2327, H.R. 2328, H.R. 2329, H.R. 2330, H.R. 2331, H.R. 2332,
H.R. 2333, H.R. 2334 before the H. Subcomm. on Irrigation ad Reclamation, 81st
Cong. 38 (1949) (statement of Royce J. Tipton, Consulting Engineer, Colo. Water
Conserv. Bd.).
148. In 2007, Colorado began crafting rules for curtailment in the
Colorado River Basin as part of the Colorado River Curtailment Studies. Ltr. from
Randy Seaholm, Ken Knox & Carol Angel to the Colorado Water Conservation
Board 1 (Nov. 4, 2007) (available at http://cwcb.state. co.us/NR/rdonlyres/
AB7913 F9-566A-43AA-846C-5C24445 89A0 1/0/1 6h.pdf). New Mexico is
currently preparing an Active Water Resources Management Initiative ("AWRM")
to allow the State Engineer to create curtailment rules. New Mexico State
Engineer's Office, Active Water Resource Management: Statewide Readiness 8
(Mar. 31, 2010) (available at http://www.ose.state.nm.us/PDF/ Maps/AWRM-
PerformanceMeasureMap.pdf). Utah is also in the midst of quantifying its present
perfected rights and examining Colorado River issues, yet it is unclear whether
Utah is undertaking a comprehensive study on curtailment or whether Utah is in the
process of promulgating curtailment procedures. Minutes and Information from
DNR Executive Water Task Force Meetings, Utah Division of Water Rights
(available at
http://www.waterrights.utah.gov/ meetinfo/taskforce.asp) (accessed June 15, 2010).
The Wyoming State Engineer's Office has created a new program called the
Colorado River Compact Administration Program. Information gathered in this
program will be used in the case of curtailment necessary to fulfill obligations in
the Colorado River Compact. Tyrrell, supra n. 147.
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water to the Upper and Lower Divisions based on data from 1899 to
1920-an unusually wet period. The data prompted negotiators to
believe the river featured an average virgin flow of (at least) 16.4
MAF per year.14 9 However, both measured flows and tree-ring data
now suggest the actual average flow of the Colorado River is
considerably less-probably no more than 15 MAF-and is likely to
drop further due to climate change.' 50  As a result, the Colorado
River is significantly over-allocated. Exacerbating the problem are
apportionment commitments under the Treaty with Mexico, and the
Supreme Court's decision to exclude Lower Basin tributaries from
the basic apportionment. 51  As noted elsewhere, inaccurate flow
assumptions not only have serious consequences, but also allocate
most of those consequences to the Upper Basin. 152
While interstate compacts are both statutory and contractual,
courts normally apply contract law to compact issues.153
Accordingly, there are two contract remedies available to the Upper
Basin states regarding the Compact: rescission (i.e., voiding) based
on mutual mistake or reformation (i.e., altering) based on mistake as
to the legal effect of language used in the Compact .1 54 Rescission is
possible only if the Upper Basin did not knowingly accept the risk of
factual mistake; if the Upper Basin did, then honoring the Compact
would still be required under contract law.' 55  This determination
may hinge on the interpretation of Article 111(d). If there is, in fact, a
delivery requirement, then the Compact seems to allocate the risk to
the Upper Division. However, if it is an obligation not to deplete or
is an expression of the equal shares theory, then perhaps it is less
149. Hundley, Water and the West: The Colorado River Compact and the
Politics of Water in the American West, supra n. 6, at 192-93.
150. USBR, supra n. 34.
151. Carlson, supra n. 32, at 14-15.
152. See e.g. Josh Clemons, Interstate Water Disputes: A Road Map for
States, 12 S.E. Envtl. L.J. 115 (2004).
153. Kan. v. Colo., 533 U.S. 1, 5-9 (2001); Tex. v. N.M., 482 U.S. 124,
130 (1987) (acknowledging that a compact is statutory but applying contract
doctrine). See David Getches, Competing Demands for the Colorado River, 56 U.
Colo. L. Rev. 413, 417 (1985); Grant, supra n. 66.
154. Carlson & Boles, supra n. 53, at 33-52
155. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 156 (198 1).
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likely that this article expressly allocates the risk of mistake to the
Upper Division, and rescission may thus be possible.156
The second possibility that the Upper Basin bears the risk of
the mistake is that Upper Basin was aware that it had only limited
facts at the time the Compact was made, but treated those facts as
sufficient.157  Throughout the negotiations, the Bureau of
Reclamation, the United States Geological Survey, and Compact
Commission sub-committees presented data to the Commissioners. 58
The negotiations and subsequent congressional testimony illustrate
that nearly all representatives believed that they had sufficient
information to apportion the river.159  Furthermore, the
representatives believed that the Colorado River had more than
sufficient flows to satisfy the apportionments.' 60 While the Upper
Basin Commissioners treated their knowledge as sufficient, the fact
that they were unaware that the knowledge was biased raises an
important question. Did they knowingly accept the risk of mistake in
apportioning the Colorado River's flow in the Compact? Given the
facts, rescission of the Compact seems plausible based on mutual
156. See Carlson, supra n. 32 at 20; Carlson & Boles, supra n. 66, at 38.
157. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 156.
158. 1 Record, supra n. 64, Sess. No. 6.
159. Delph Carpenter (Colorado) said that, "the twenty-year record that we
had will not be improved by more records at this point. And the hydrographs and
experts advise me that a twenty-year record on a river is adequate in its
completeness and includes enough years to warrant an assumption that the average
there deduced would be the average flow of the river in the future." 1 Record,
supra n. 64, Sess. No. 12 at 6. Carpenter also remarked that engineers presenting
to the group had indicated that a fifty-year record would be best to determine an
extreme minimum, but that general calculations could be accomplished through a
twenty-year record. 1 Record, supra n. 64, Sess. No. 12, at 29.
160. Richard Sloan, the legal advisor to Arizona's Colorado River
Commission, believed that one of the major assumptions of the Compact was that
"sufficient water [exists] in the river if conserved to meet all the demands for
agricultural and business use, both in the upper and lower basins," and that this was
illustrated by a "study of the river and of various estimates made by reclamation
service and by state engineers." H.R. Doc. No. 717, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. A66
(1948). Specifically, Commissioner Emerson from Wyoming declared that "over
18,500,000 acre-feet of water is contributed annually to the river by the Upper
Basin, and all of this amount could be diverted and the return flow would still be
sufficient to supply the specified delivery at Lee's Ferry." H.R. Doc. No. 717, 80th
Cong., 2d Sess. A127 (1948).
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mistake; however, it is unlikely that the remedy would provide any
real benefit to the Upper Basin.1 6 1 Since the Lower Division uses
more water and has senior water rights over the Upper Basin, voiding
the Compact and equitably apportioning the Colorado River is
unlikely to improve the Upper Division's current allocations.162
Reformation of the Compact to resolve legal ambiguities may
be another option for the Upper Basin. However, the Upper Basin
must prove that reformation should follow the Compact's approach
of dividing water equally.' 63 Reformation due to mistake requires
that the mistake arise from a writing or where the parties
misunderstand the legal effect of the language.164  As discussed
earlier, it is plausible that the parties misunderstood the legal effect of
some of the terms used-"equitable division" for example.165 More
problematic is the prohibition against reformation. When third
parties rely on the contract to acquire property interests, courts
disallow reformation.166 Since 1922, numerous water users in the
Upper and Lower Basins have relied on the provisions in the
Compact.167 This includes individual irrigators, municipalities, water
supply companies, power companies, and recreational users, among
others.168 Reformation to ensure equal shares would likely affect
Lower Basin users more severely than Upper Basin users, and could
unfairly affect the rights of third parties acting in reliance on the
Compact's provisions.169
161. Carlson & Boles, supra n. 66, at 45.
162. Id. at 21-45.
163. Getches, supra n. 116, at 417.
164. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 155 (1981) (Reformation due to
mistake as to written expression may occur "where a writing that evidences or
embodies an agreement in whole or in part fails to express the agreement because
of a mistake of both parties as to the contents or effects of the writing.").
165. Compact, supra n. 8, at art. 111(a). See Section III(B)-Issue 2.
166. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 155 (The court can reform the
contract to "express the agreement, except to the extent that rights of third parties
such as good faith purchases for value will be unfairly affected.").
167. United States Bureau of Reclamation, Introduction, in Colorado
River Interim Surplus Criteria FEIS 13 (2000).
168. Id.
169. See Carlson & Boles, supra n. 66, at 45-46.
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Reformation of the Compact is theoretically possible using
either congressional or judicial pathways. When Congress consents
to an interstate compact, it presumably retains the right to revise or
interpret the agreement. 170  However, it is unlikely to revise a
compact in the absence of demonstrable injustice. 171 As the Upper
Basin states are well aware, the Lower Basin wields the political
leverage associated with high populations, large economies, and vast
congressional representation.172 Alternatively, the Supreme Court
could address, under original jurisdiction, whether the Compact
should be enforced when it produces such an unintended and
inequitable result.173  Since the Court accepted the Compact's
allocations in Arizona v. California,174 it would likely hesitate to
modify the Compact. Yet, the fact remains that the Colorado River
Compact was a contract based on a factual error (about average flow
volumes), an expectation (at least among some parties) of equal
sharing, and an ignorance of climate change.175 The combined effect
of these deficiencies, especially on the Upper Basin, may be too
extreme to ignore.176 Additionally, a precedent for this type of action
already exists: in Texas v. New Mexico, the Supreme Court used
contract law to change the flawed allocation formula in the Pecos
River Compact. 177
170. David Getches, Competing Demands for the Colorado River, 56 U.
Colo. L. Rev. 413, 426 (1985).
171. Id.
172. For example, the Lower Basin has 75 Congressional representatives
(California - 60, Arizona - 10, Nevada - 5). The Upper Basin has 22
congressional representatives (Colorado - 9, New Mexico - 5, Utah - 5, Wyoming
- 3). U.S. House of Representatives, Directory of Representatives (available at
http://www.house.gov/representatives/); U.S. Senate, Senators of the 12th
Congress (available at http://www.senate.gov/general/contact-information/senators
cfm.cfm).
173. U.S. Const. art. 111, 2, cl. 2.
174. Ariz. v. Cal., 373 U.S. at 565. It's worth noting, however, that
Arizona v. California primarily focused on an intra-basin dispute, and not the inter-
basin apportionment.
175. Kenney, supra n. 35, at 17-19.
176. See e.g. Getches, supra n. 72; Grant, supra n. 66; and Adler, supra n.
5.
177. In Texas v. New Mexico, the Court held that "unless the compact to
which Congress has consented is somehow unconstitutional, no court may order
relief inconsistent with its express terms." Tex. v. N.M, 462 U.S. 554, 564 (1983).
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IV. CHARTING A DIFFERENT COURSE: COLORADO RIVER
LEADERS' VIEWS ON OPTIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES
A. Assessment Overview
Researchers with the University of Montana's Center for
Natural Resources and Environmental Policy spoke with Colorado
River Basin leaders in late 2010 and early 2011 to identify areas of
shared concern and possible steps to respond to future challenges
facing the basin. 178  The leaders included current and former
employees of local governments, states, interstate agencies, and
tribes, as well as the U.S. and Mexican governments, water supply
organizations, conservation groups, universities, and related research
institutes.
Several common themes emerged in the conversations. First,
leaders expressed shared concerns that the Colorado River Basin's
water supply and demand are in a precarious balance, and that
conditions are likely to get less certain rather than more secure in the
near term. 17 9  Second, although many people anticipate increased
conflict as a result of current conditions, leaders expressed shared
preferences for resolving conflicts through discussion and
negotiation, and an equally strong aversion to Compact-related
litigation.180 Third, although the conversations revealed nothing
resembling consensus about the ideal response to these challenges,
people from a variety of backgrounds acknowledged the need to
address and in some way involve more diverse interests in basin
management.
The Pecos Compact was found to be based on a flawed allocation formula that lead
to a variety of water delivery problems, leading the Court to enact a new allocation
formula, although not relieving New Mexico from the obligation of remedying the
past failures under the initial agreement. See Tex. v. N.M, 482 U.S. at 133.
178. CNREP, supra n. 3.
179. Id. at 3, 17.
180. Id.at3,21.
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B. Assessment Questions and Responses
The assessment summarized the leaders' responses to two
broad questions that began each conversation:
(1) If the Colorado River continues to be managed pursuant to
current laws, including the Interim Guidelines, 81 what conditions
do you foresee in 15 years in terms of water shortages, water
security, and interstate conflicts?
Hydrologic Conditions: "The sky is not falling ... yet."
Although all do not agree that climate change is the cause,
leaders expressed general agreement that water supplies will be more
stressed and conditions less certain in the future.1 82 They shared a
consistent message that all parties need to be prepared for continued
increases in demand and tighter supplies.' 8 3 All those involved in
water supply planning said that they are currently taking the
projected shortage into account.1 84
As underscored by the supply/demand deficit described
above, the Colorado River is near or beyond capacity in meeting the
demands of current uses. Several people remarked that growth has
proceeded without regard for limitations.'8 5 The recession reduced
growth in the region and thus dampened demand for urban supplies,
at least temporarily.186 In response to tightening supplies, water users
in some areas have turned to groundwater pumping.' 8 7  Several
people expressed concern that this finite source of water might prove
an unreliable substitute for Colorado River water, and suggested that
regulatory attention would be necessary to address this trend.'88
Others noted that groundwater storage can be a useful mechanism to
181. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, supra n. 25.
182. CNREP, supra n. 3, at 3, 17.
183. Id. at 17-19.
184. Id. at 19.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 18.




buffer shortages, and described current practices to "bank" unused
portions of states' allotments for use in case of curtailment.' 89
A shortage as defined in the Interim Guidelines is likely to be
declared much sooner than was anticipated in 2007.190 Many people
characterized the Interim Guidelines as well-intentioned but
insufficient to address conditions likely to develop in the coming
decade or two.19' Several people predicted the conditions in the next
15 years in terms of scenarios-from relatively wet to extremely dry.
In each case, the "dry" scenario included conditions that would
exceed the anticipated shortfall in the Interim Guidelines, possibly
for multiple years in a row, causing substantial political and legal
ramifications.' 92 Given the possibility that Lake Mead's elevation
may drop below the initial threshold level for a shortage declaration
as early as 2012, it was not surprising to hear that basin states are
already discussing how such a shortage might play out.
Political Conditions: Unstable footing ahead
The consequences of a shortage would vary a great deal
among the seven basin states. As described above, the Compact's
formula for water allocation exposes the parties to different levels of
risk, as shortages do not fall equally.' 93 Leaders described the
situation as "basinwide misallocation," "gross inequities," and "a
battle between the haves and the have-nots."l 94 Some remarked that
this sort of disparity is likely to provoke litigation unless the parties
can negotiate a different way to deal with shortages.195 One source
of instability is that individual water users in the basin rely on water
rights that depend on states receiving their full share of Colorado
189. See e.g. Storage and Interstate Release Agreement, 43 C.F.R. pt. 414
(WL current through June 30, 2011) (available at http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region
/g4000/contracts/ SNWAMWDSIRAfinal.pdf).
190. CNREP, supra n. 3, at 19.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. See discussion supra at Section III and CNREP supra n. 3 at 20.
194. CNREP, supra n. 3, at 20.
195. Id.
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River water. 196 If a shortage forces delivery curtailments, the impact
will cascade through the water user chain, but impacts will not be
spread evenly due to different users' priorities.197
A variety of unresolved legal issues make discussion of
solutions difficult; some will have to be resolved to move forward
productively.198 Colorado River leaders interviewed for the
assessment concluded that these issues would require resolution
before long-term solutions are possible. 199  Among the most
frequently mentioned legal issues were the following:
* How to treat tributary waters in the Lower Basin;
* Whether and how deliveries to Mexico may be limited in
times of shortage, and how the delivery obligation to Mexico
is shared between the Upper and Lower Basins;
* What happens if Lake Mead drops below elevation 1,025 feet,
200 the lowest contemplated level in the Interim Criteria (one
person remarked that the Interim Criteria are "political, not
hydrological"); and
* Resolution of the Navajo Nation's reserved rights claim on
the mainstem river and its tributaries.
Leaders predicted a real possibility of litigation in the next 15
years, although most parties share a strong commitment to resolve
conflicts outside of the courtroom. 20 1 Some of the leaders predicted a
Compact call within the next 15 years.202 No one viewed the
prospect of a new lawsuit in the Supreme Court as an attractive
option for resolving outstanding legal issues, but many remarked that




199. CNREP, supra n. 3, at 20.
200. The elevation was 1,096 feet as of March 31, 2011, having risen from
a low of 1,081 feet in November, 2010. Bureau of Reclamation, Lake Mead at
Hoover Dam: Elevation (ft.) (2011) (available at
http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g4000/hourly/mead-elv.html).





possibility linked it with the likelihood of an intensified conflict over
how the Upper and Lower Basins share the delivery obligation to
Mexico.204 There was a general agreement that litigation is always
an option, often discussed, and universally viewed as the least
productive way forward. Several people described an informal but
shared agreement to consult with one another before taking steps
toward litigation.205 Many people cited the Interim Guidelines as a
positive and encouraging example of the states' willingness to set
aside their differences and resolve issues without litigation.206
Many feel strongly that the Law of the River provides
important protection for states' interests and does not require major
changes.207 Proposals for change are contentious in the Colorado
River Basin.20 8 Many but not all the leaders shared the opinion that
the existing legal regime provides a sufficient balance of certainty
and flexibility to adapt to new challenges. 209 This was the dominant
but not universal opinion among the people interviewed.210 Some
expressed concerns that the system's vulnerabilities are greater than
is generally acknowledged.2 11
Recent initiatives offer encouragement for the promise of
collaborative solutions, assuming the parties have an incentive to
negotiate. Over the past 20 years, various interests in the Colorado
River Basin have collaborated to respond to environmental and other
challenges.212 In many cases, the federal government provided the
leverage for the collaboration through mandates in congressional
legislation, reulatory programs, financial incentives, and resolution
of litigation. Leaders expressed cautious optimism that such
204. Id.
205. Id. at 22.
206. CNREP, supra n.3, at 22.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 22.
210. Id.
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initiatives demonstrate the ability of basin interests to work
productively across jurisdictional lines.214
Some see an unmet need for leadership in the basin, defined
generally as political leaders willing to step beyond the interest of
215their own constituencies and promote a basin-wide vision. Several
people noted that the Secretary of the Interior played a critical role in
sparking the discussions that led to the Interim Guidelines by
threatening to address shortages through federal regulations. 216 Some
suggested that similar intervention might be necessary soon to update
and revise the Interim Guidelines. 2 17
(2) What might be necessary to achieve a more satisfactory outcome
in this time period and beyond? We're interested in your thoughts
about how to improve decision-making processes, certainty,
meaningful participation by stakeholders, and politicalfinancial
support for innovative management solutions.
The Law of the River: The key is flexibility
The majority of leaders agreed with the fundamental value of
the Law of the River as it currently exists.218 In particular, leaders
expressed near-universal opposition to the idea of renegotiating the
1922 Compact, which is seen as the foundational document of the
214. One example mentioned by several people is the Upper Colorado
River Endangered Fish Recovery Program, which was established in 1988 through
a cooperative agreement between the Governors of Colorado, Utah, and Wyoming;
the Secretary of the Interior; and the Administrator of Western Area Power
Administration. Other efforts received mixed reviews, including the Glen Canyon
Adaptive Management Working Group, which includes states, Indian nations,
environmental groups, and resource managers from federal agencies. Because
many of the issues regarding implementation of this group's work remain
contentious, not everyone holds this up as a model for future collaborative efforts,
but some mentioned it as an example of a movement toward more inclusive and
"rational" approaches to addressing Basin challenges. Upper Colorado River
Endangered Fish Recovery Program, About the Upper Colorado River Endangered
Fish Recovery Program (2011) (available at http://colorado
riverrecovery.org/general-information/about.html).
215. CNREP, supra n. 3, at 23.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 25.
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Law of the River.219 On the other hand, leaders expressed
widespread support for the idea of negotiating changes that would
update and improve implementation of the Law of the River. 220
Several people observed that the idea of major institutional change is
22 1worrisome, as states fear losing their current legal allocations. One
person predicted no major changes to the Law of the River in the
next 15 years because: (1) it provides certainty and definition of
existing rights; and (2) the costs of renegotiating are prohibitively
high in terms of time, effort, and money. 222
A number of people cited the Interim Guidelines as an
example of how the Law of the River provides sufficient flexibility to
meet critical water supply demands in the face of changing
conditions. 223 Some suggested using the flexibility to improve the
rules governing river management.224 But, importantly, some
predicted the need for larger changes, possibly rethinking the terms
of the Compact. 225 "In the short term," said one, "we have the
capacity to work cooperatively . . . but in the long run we have not
shown the willingness to address very difficult issues for the seven
states . . . No one will come out of this unscathed." 2 2 6 Another, noting
the incorrect flow assumptions in the Compact, remarked that the
impacts of climate change might push the limits of the agreement
beyond viability.227
Many people noted the importance of a broader and more
sustained conversation among Colorado River Basin interests to
address challenges ahead. One person noted that, "it is a fair
criticism that states have left others out of the decisions until the
end." 228  Another described the system as "shuttle diplomacy,"
219. Id.




224. Id. at 26.
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because environmentalists and others are left out of direct
negotiations but manage to provide input by informal means of
229consultation and input-a sort of guerrilla consultation process.
Several initiatives (such as the multi-party endangered species
recovery efforts) have successfully engaged a broader group of
stakeholders and sovereign entities, including conservation groups,
Indian nations, and Mexico. But most important planning and
decision processes are limited to the seven basin states in cooperation
with the federal government. 2 30
Some believe that broader participation is possible within
existing institutions, pointing to the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation's
outreach efforts related to the Interim Guidelines as a positive
example of how this might be done. 23 1 A number of people
suggested creation of a new basin-wide forum or entity to help
coordinate planning, management, and/or dispute resolution. 232 The
various models that might be considered include:
* A new organization with decision-making powers, such as a
river basin authority;
* A body that plays more of a coordinating and advisory role,
such as a river basin council or a basin-wide compact
commission;
* A nested collection of local bodies that feed information into
a larger basin-wide coordinating council; and
* An ongoing forum for sustained dialogue and problem
solving.
Some felt that such a change would provide the opportunity to
involve broader interests in Colorado River Basin management.233
One person suggested that a basin-wide forum could "broaden the
circle of cooperation" among basin interests (including Mexico and
Indian nations), and help integrate various resource management
229. CNREP, supra n. 3 at 26.
230. Id.
231. Id.




efforts.234 Other suggested benefits of a new entity include:
prioritizing sub-basin projects and individual actions; addressing
operations of the river as a whole, relative to Upper Basin releases
and Lower Basin demands; unifying and coordinating management
decisions; and providing an "ongoing forum for genuine
communication, understanding, and agreement." 235 Others expressed
equally strong opinions that such a broad conversation would not
accomplish much and would not be consistent with the states'
primary role as implementers of the Law of the River.236 Several
people predicted gridlock if a new basin entity extended decision-
making authority beyond the current players. 2 37
Some believe that the Secretary of the Interior could play a
more active role in coordinating and directing basin-wide
238discussions. Opinions are decidedly mixed on this question.
Many think it appropriate that the federal government supports state
leadership in the basin, but does not control it. Among the identified
roles for the Secretary of the Interior:
* Pressure parties to negotiate through threatened exercise of
allocation/operation authority.
* Pressure the Upper Basin to prepare for the possibility of a
Compact call.
* Implement federal environmental mandates and support
multi-party restoration initiatives.
* Ensure meaningful representation of public interests and other
parties not otherwise represented in existing decision
processes.
* Access financial resources and technical support (including
modeling).
234. CNREP, supra n. 3, at 27.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 27.
238. Id. at 28.
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* Promote the national significance of the Colorado River Basin
(along the lines of the Everglades239 and Great Lakes 24) to
garner political support and resources for action.
As described above, leaders expressed general agreement that
the shortage conditions specified in the Interim Guidelines are likely
to occur far sooner than the states anticipated when negotiating the
provisions in 2007. Many expect to revisit the agreement sooner than
its expiration in 2026.241 According to some, such conversations are
242
already beginning. A few interviewees suggested specific changes
that might be considered, such as revising elevations that trigger a
shortage declaration and addressing concerns about power generation
capacity in light of reservoir levels. 24 3 Some would like to see the
criteria more explicitly linked to climate change impacts, with
additional decision-making processes and management actions
triggered when projected impacts occur. 244  Others called for a
simpler method for calculating such triggers. 245
As described above, some believe shortages may become
severe enough to warrant Compact enforcement, sparking litigation
and conflict. Several people suggested that the Upper Basin states
should craft a new agreement among themselves to guide their
response to a Compact call.246  Several others mentioned that
preliminary discussions among Upper Basin states toward this end
are already underway. 247
239. U.S. Army Corps of Engr., Central and Southern Florida
Comprehensive Review Study: Final Integrated Feasibility Report and
Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (1999).
240. The Great Lakes Charter: Principles for the Management of Great
Lakes Water Resources, reprinted in Great Lakes Governors Task Force, Council
of Great Lakes Governors, Final Report and Recommendations: Great Lakes
Governors Task Force on Water Diversions and Great Lakes Institutions, app. III
at 40-45 (1985).









River Management: More information and better practices
Many people mentioned the work currently underway on the
Colorado River Basin Water Supply and Demand Study. 248 Some
see it as a promising opportunity to develop scenarios for a range of
hydrologic and growth conditions, but several expressed skepticism
about the likely product.249 One person suggested that the Basin
Study's approach could be complemented by use of the Delphi
Method 250 to solicit water managers' views about the likelihood and
timing of a potential Compact call.251 This approach would reveal
just how serious a threat a Compact call may be and provide an
informed prediction of timing. It might provide a useful complement
to the modeling work underway, and would give a sense of the
variation in opinions among the Upper and Lower Basin leaders.
A number of people believe that the only way to meet
growing demands is to enhance the basin's natural water supplies.
The options mentioned included weather modification, desalination
of ocean water, brackish water treatment, urban runoff capture and
reuse, and imported supplies from outside the basin, such as a
pipeline to the Mississippi River.2 52 Several people expected that
augmentation would be a primary focus of the options identified in
248. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, supra n. 5.
249. CNREP, supra n. 3, at 29.
250. The Delphi Method is a structured communication technique, a
systematic and interactive forecasting method that depends on a panel of experts
who respond to questions in a series of surveys, with each new round informed by a
summary of answers (and the respondents' reasoning) to the previous round. Thus,
experts revise their answers based on what they've heard from one another and-it
is believed-the range of answers is refined and narrowed to reflect the best-
informed "correct" outcome. Norman C. Dalkey, The Delphi Method: An
Experimental Application of Group Opinion, in Norman Dalkey, et al. (Eds.)
Studies in the Quality ofLife (1972).
251. CNREP, supra n. 3, at 29.
252. Id. at 30.
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the Basin Study.253 The Colorado River Augmentation Study
254described and evaluated a menu of twelve augmentation strategies.
Several leaders emphasized more aggressive
conservation/efficiency measures such as irrigation improvements,
lining canals, dry-year leasing from irrigators, eliminating invasive
species, and water reuse.255
A number of leaders predicted an increase in voluntary
transfers from agricultural to urban water users throughout the basin,
with a few noting that the quantities of water available from irrigated
agriculture are more than sufficient to meet projected urban needs.256
Such transfers raise issues of impacts on other irrigators and the
environment, which several people noted as requiring attention and
mitigation. 257
Some argued in favor of cross-boundary water exchanges,
including interstate water banks. 258  Several suggested economic
arrangements in which water users and states pay others to forgo
water use and allow water to flow to more economically valuable
uses. 259 Those favoring this sort of exchange expressed confidence
that the Law of the River would permit it. Others are concerned that
an exchange would threaten state allotments, and cautioned that any




254. Southern Nevada Water Authority, Colorado River Augmentation
Study (2011) (available at http://www.snwa.com /html/wr colrvr augmentation.
html).
255. One person mentioned the Prairie Water Program in Aurora,
Colorado, as an example. This project captures the city's return flows, pumps and
treats the water, and reintroduces the supply into city reservoirs, boosting the city's
supplies by as much as 20%. Aurora Water, Prairie Waters Project (2011)
(available at http://www.prairiewaters.org).
256. See e.g. Douglas J. Kenney, The Colorado River: What Prospect for
'a River No More'? in River Basin Trajectories: Societies, Environments, and
Development (Frangois Molle & Phillipus Wester 2009).
257. CNREP, supra n. 3, at 30.
258. Id.
259. For example, one person suggested that California could agree to
share shortage calls in exchange for access to marketable water that is not currently




Several people mentioned arrangements already in place for
cooperative water storage. For example, the Southern Nevada Water
Authority stores water for the Metropolitan Water Agency of
Southern California. 26 1 Lower Basin water entities have negotiated
more of these arrangements than their Upper Basin counterparts.
However, Wyoming manages water in North Platte River reservoirs
using a flexible system of ownership accounts, so this is not an
unfamiliar concept in the Upper Basin.262 Those who receive water
from the Colorado Big Thompson Project in Colorado receive shares
that vary in quantity annually depending on supplies.263
Many people mentioned the ongoing importance of
addressing environmental issues on the Colorado River. Concerns
include restoration of the Colorado River Delta ecosystem, which is
designated for protection under the Ramsar Convention;264
addressing impacts of desalting on a large scale; protecting the intact
tributaries of the White, Yampa, and Green rivers in the Upper Basin;
and protecting and recovering endangered species throughout the
basin. 265
Several people noted that habitat restoration is an
experimental process, and much remains to be learned about how to
measure success. 266 Others noted that environmental flows need to
be part of every modeling process, but generally are not.267 Another
argued for a basin-wide evaluation of the investments in ecological
261. See Wash. Dept. of Ecology, Analysis of Water Banks in the Western
States (2004) (available at http://www.ecy.wa.gov /biblio/041 1011).
262. CNREP, supra n. 3, at 31.
263. N. Colo. Water Conserv. Dist., Colorado-Big Thompson Project
(2011) (available at http://www.ncwcd.org/project _features/cbt main.asp).
264. The Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, called the
Ramsar Convention, is an intergovernmental treaty that provides the framework for
national action and international cooperation for the conservation and wise use of
wetlands and their resources. The treaty was adopted in the Iranian city of Ramsar
in 1971; the United States and Mexico are both parties to the convention.
Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as Waterfowl
Habitat, Feb. 2, 1971, T.I.A.S. No. 1084, 996 U.N.T.S. 245 (1971).
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mitigation and restoration relative to the results they achieved.
[Name] suggested that money could be spent more strategically on
portions of the river and tributaries where full restoration is an actual
possibility. 268 And one person suggested that such an evaluation
should not be limited to environmental flows, but should extend to all
uses of Colorado River water.2 69
Some mentioned that habitat and flow restoration initiatives
provide broad public benefits, but this is at a cost to water and power
interests.270 Some suggested that the public beneficiaries of
environmental protection measures should compensate those who
bear the burden of altered flows or other measures. 27 1 Others felt that
restoration is among the highest priorities for future management.272
One person cautioned that the primary goal of Colorado River
management is to meet economic and social needs: "Environmental
considerations take a back seat out of necessity." 2 73 Another noted
that the river's hydrological changes are permanent, and we ought to
recognize that restoring some species is unlikely and perhaps
undesirable. 274 Similarly, one person expressed doubt that people
will be willing to give up significant amounts of water and energy to
save species such as the humpback chub when pressures get
intense.275
Some suggested that the looming pressures on Colorado River
management will require monetary contributions from water users,
states, conservationists, and others.276 One person suggested a small
fee on water users' bills to go into a basin-wide fund to pay for
conservation improvements and other measures to stretch resources
277
as far as possible. Several mentioned the importance of continued
and expanded support for projects funded by the Title XVI Water
268. Id.
269. Id.




274. Id. at 31-32.





Reclamation and Reuse Program, 278 described as an incentive for
water providers to adapt infrastructure to climate change and
encourage water conservation. One person urged expansion of the
program to include the practice of treating and injecting water into
aquifers to be used for municipal supplies.
C. Some Options
The leaders interviewed for this assessment did not speak
with a unified voice, but their observations suggest numerous starting
points for productive, forward-looking dialogue. The conversations
suggest several opportunities for action.
First, it would be productive to explore how to improve
public engagement in the Colorado River Basin, both within and
alongside official decision processes. 2 79  Experience with regional
collaboration in many parts of the country2 80 suggests that the
conditions may be ripe in the Colorado River Basin to explore
options for complementary processes to involve a wider range of
interests to address these issues and inform future management
decisions. Several leaders expressed strong interest in some type a
basin-wide forum.28 1 The Secretary of the Interior could play an
important role in encouraging and supporting such a broader
dialogue, but success would be more likely if this were not solely a
federal initiative.
278. Authorized by the Reclamation, Wastewater and Groundwater Study
and Facilities Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-575), this program provides funds for the
reclamation and reuse of wastewater and naturally impaired ground and surface
waters through projects constructed and owned by non-federal sponsors in
partnership with states and local water managers. Projects aim at: improving water
use efficiency; supplementing water supplies; increasing drought resistance in
existing water supplies; and reduced reliance on inter-basin water transfers. U.S.
Bureau of Reclamation, Title XVI Fact Sheet (2009).
279. See e.g. Getches, supra n. 72 (on the federal role in creating a new
authority) and Jean R. Stemlight, Symposium - Collaboration and the Colorado
River, 8 Nev. L.J. 803 (Spring 2007).
280. See Matthew J. McKinney & Shawn Johnson, Working Across
Boundaries: People, Nature, and Regions (Lincoln Inst. of Land Policy 2009).
281. CNREP, supra n. 3, at 33.
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Second, given the broad agreement that conditions are likely
to be less certain in the future (with many believing this to mean less
water availability), it makes sense to step up efforts to find agreement
about a range of long-term river flow scenarios. Ideally, hydrological
models need to encompass a wide enough range of possible
conditions to inform a discussion of the choices that future
uncertainty implies. The leaders' assessment underscored a shared
belief that a sense of crisis can provide an opportunity to drive parties
to the table to discuss options that otherwise might not be politically
acceptable. The current Basin Study process is one platform for
discussion, but it should be reconciled with others under
development.
Third, beyond the questions of supply, which are the focus of
various hydrological models, the demand side of the equation
deserves equal attention. Although many of the leaders expressed a
desire to maintain the protected status of all existing uses, others
suggested that it is time for thoughtful evaluation of all uses-human
and environmental-as part of envisioning a sustainable future for
the Colorado River Basin. This concern about water uses suggests
the value of an honest and integrated analysis of the possibilities for
and impacts of augmentation, conservation and efficiency, market-
based transfers, and environmental mitigation and restoration.282 The
current deficit between annual supply and demand in the Basin
suggests that future shortage risks be minimized by offsetting any
new consumptive uses with reductions in existing demands.
Voluntary reallocation of water from lower- to higher-valued uses is
likely to play an increasingly important role in meeting anticipated
human and environmental demands in the Basin.
Fourth, although some of the water management challenges
facing the Colorado River Basin are physical, many are political.283
The division of the basin into two halves at Lee Ferry, and the
allocation of entitlements based on that division, offers both a firm
anchor for enforcing responsibilities and an arbitrary separation of a
single river basin. At least some of today's conflicts could be
alleviated by: (1) a basin-wide approach to water management,
282. Lawrence MacDonnell, The Disappearing Colorado River (pending
publication 2011).
283. CNREP, supra n. 3, at 34.
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optimizing use of the basin's extensive storage facilities to meet an
overall water budget rather than focusing on water deliveries at Lee
Ferry; and (2) considering additional agreements similar to the
Interim Guidelines to address shortages.
Finally, it is common for people to speak of the Colorado
River Compact and the Law of the River interchangeably, although
the Compact is just one element (albeit the foundational document)
of the broader Law of the River. To be clear, a minority of leaders
suggested actions that would require revisiting the Compact; the
majority would prefer to leave this document alone. A far greater
number of people observed that the Law of the River is dynamic-as
evidenced by the 2007 Interim Guidelines-and predicted that it will
continue to change to reflect new realities and values in the Basin.
The conflation of these references often derails public conversations
about options and opportunities, resulting in misunderstanding that a
policy proposal is taking aim at the Compact when in fact it would
affect further evolution of the Law of the River. Additional clarity
may encourage more constructive dialogue and an honest exchange
of ideas to address identified challenges.
IV. CONCLUSION
This review of key hydrologic and water-use trends, legal and
political positions, and the insights of key Colorado River leaders
collectively paints a picture of a basin on the cusp of significant
change. Even the most ardent supporter of the status quo will
acknowledge that demands cannot, over the long term, outstrip
supplies; the Law of the River may allow this, but the laws of physics
will not. What is not so apparent is how the water budget will be
brought into balance, and the degree to which the required changes
will result from deliberate and well-reasoned reforms or from a less
managed, piecemeal (and presumably more disruptive) process. But
the inevitability of change is difficult to deny.
Basin states widely disparage the notion of the federal
government imposing on them, but if solutions are to emerge from
interstate negotiations, it is unclear if existing forums and processes
of decision-making are sufficient to meet this formidable governance
2011] 151
152 PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAWREVIEW
challenge. Several of the needed areas of conversation remain
politically sensitive (if not completely taboo), including strategies for
limiting existing and projected demands, for expanding the role of
markets (perhaps both intra- and inter-state), for adapting
arrangements to meet the uncertainties associated with climate
change, and for resolving the remaining omissions and ambiguities in
the Law of the River. Additionally, while it may conceptually be
desirable to include more voices and ideas in these discussions, it will
take great skill and leadership to make sure the discussions lead
toward sustainable and equitable solutions, rather than to greater
delays and tighter gridlock.
There are many reasons for optimism despite the magnitude
of the challenges. On several previous occasions, the basin states,
Mexico, and the U.S. government have successfully negotiated
agreements on many facets of Colorado River management.
Additionally, the physical infrastructure for controlling Colorado
River flows, while contributing to many environmental problems,
also offers several opportunities for operational flexibility. And
perhaps most importantly, there is a rapidly growing cadre of
decision-makers, researchers, and other stakeholders who have
demonstrated serious commitment to crafting long-term solutions. It
is time to build upon this momentum and the assembled data, and to
make the most of the short window of opportunity that remains.
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